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former proceeding and that could not have been ascertained 
with due diligence. [15] Since the trial on the vacation 
issue has never been completed, but only suspended by the 
appeal from the order denying modification of the divorce 
decree, use of the evidence at the 1951 hearing does not come 
within the rule that evidence at a former trial is usually 
inadmissible at a second trial. (See Blache v. Blache, 37 
Cal.2d 531, 534-536 [233 P.2d 547].) 
[16] Neilma has filed a ·motion requesting this court to 
take additional evidence under section 956a to support an 
affirmance of the order denying modification of the final de-
cree. Since there is sufficient evidence in the record to sup-
port the findings and the order below, no purpose would 
be served by granting the motion and it will therefore be 
denied. 
The order denying the motion to change custody is af-
firmed. The motions to make a special order and to take 
additional evidence under section 956a are denied. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J ., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
[S. F. No. 18596. In Bank. July 11, 1952.] 
MARVIN HANDLER, Appellant, v. BOARD OF SUPER-
VISORS OF THE COUNTY OF SAN MATEO et al., 
Respondents. 
[1] Mandamus-Pleading-Demurrer to Petition.-Where respond-
ents demurred generally to a petition for a writ of mandate 
and the matter was argued on questions of law and submitted 
to the court which rendered judgment that petitioner take 
nothing and that the alternative writ be dismissed, the allega-
tions of the petition must be accepted as true. 
[2] District and Prosecuting Attorneys-Deputies and Assistants. 
- Gov. Code, § 31000, declaring that board of supervisors may 
contract with and employ any person for furnishing special 
services and advice in financial, economic, accounting, en-
gineering, legal or administrative matters, authorizes board 
of San Mateo County, whose charter makes applicable "general 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Mandamus, § 88; Am.Jur., Mandamus, § 364. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 88; [2] District and 
Prosecuting .Attorneys, § 16; [3, 4] Counties, § 31.5; [5] Public 
Utilities, § 48; [ 6] Counties, § 120. 
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laws of the state" in matters relating to employment, to 
contract with or employ an attorney and a traffic engineer .as 
"special assistants to the District Attorney'' for performance 
of special services in opposing rate increases of a public utility. 
[3] Counties-Officers and Employees-Specialists.-Employment 
of an attorney and a traffic engineer as specialists for per-
formance of special services for a county need not be by 
ordinance as distinguished from a resolution, where the charter 
provisions, which refer to action by ordinance, deal with 
officers and regular employees, deputies and assistants. 
[4] !d.-Officers and Employees-Specialists.-Persons performing 
specialized expert services for a county do so on a temporary 
basis and are neither officers nor employees; they are more 
akin to independent contractors. 
[6] Public Utilities-Hearings-Who May Make Complaint.-Pub. 
Utilities Code, § 1702, declaring that complaint may be made 
to the Public Utilities Commission by any "body politic" or 
"municipal corporation" as well as others concerning the rates 
charged by any public utility, authorizes a county to appear 
in rate regulation proceedings before such commission. 
[6] Counties-Fiscal Matters.-County has power to expend money 
for employment of a specialist to oppose increase in rates 
of a public utility where, among other factors, the county has 
a public interest in affording protection to a substantial portion 
of the residents or prospective residents who are affected. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County. Edmund Scott, Judge. Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel county auditor to ap-
prove, and county treasurer to pay, claim for legal services. 
Judgment denying writ reversed. 
Paul A. McCarthy and Howard Magee for Appellant. 
Louis B. DeMatteis, District Attorney, Keith C. Sorensen 
and John A. Bruning, Assistant District Attorneys, for Re-
spondents. 
CARTER, J.-Plaintiff petitioned for a writ of mandate 
to compel the controller of San Mateo County to draw a 
warrant for payment of his claim for $1,500, which had 
been approved by the board of supervisors. An alternate 
[5] See Clal.Jur., Public Utilities and Services, § 32; Am.Jur., 
Public Utilities and Services, § 218. 
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writ was issued and respondents, as their return thereto, 
demurred generally to the petition. [1] The matter was 
argued on questions of law and submitted to the court which 
rendered judgment that petitioner take nothing and that 
the alternative writ be dismissed. Under these circumstances 
the allegations of the petition must be accepted as true. 
(Merchants Serv. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 35 Cal.2d 109, 
110 [216 P.2d 846] ; Kennedy v. Ross, 28 Cal.2d 569, 571 
[170 P.2d 904]; 16 Cal.Jur. 866 et seq.) 
According to the petition, plaintiff is an attorney admitted 
to practice in California and has been specializing for 15 
years in public utility rate regulation. The Southern Pacific 
Company operates passenger trains between San Francisco 
and San Jose and way points in San Mateo County. It 
applied to the Public Utilities Commission for an increase 
in passenger fares on such trains. Commuters in San Mateo 
County formed an association which employed plaintiff to 
represent them to resist the application before the commis-
sion. Plaintiff arranged with Fred Chestnut, a traffic en-
gineer, to assist him. The proceeding is now, and has been 
sincfl 1949, pending before the commission and plaintiff has 
been performing the services for which he was employed. 
On November 25, 1949, the board of supervisors of the county 
at a meeting "agreed to employ" plaintiff and Chestnut as 
"special assistants to the District Attorney" and to appropri-
ate up to $2,000 toward their compensation for services in 
opposing the rate increases if proportionate amounts were ap-
propriated by the municipalities and contributed by the com-
muters in the county. The funds from other sources were 
obtained and on June 20, 1950, the board adopted a reso-
lution by a four to nothing vote (there was one vacancy), 
wherein it was declared that the fare increase would be 
detrimental to the general welfare of the county and it is 
to the best interest of the county to oppose the increase. 
Therefore, $1,500 is transferred from the unbudgeted reserves 
to the 11 .Advertising Budget, Maintenance and Operation, 
Promotional Requests-Various and Sundries Appropriation'' 
to be used to employ plaintiff and Chestnut as special assist-
ants to the district attorney to oppose the increase. On June 
30, 1950, plaintiff presented a verified claim to the board for 
the $1,500. It was approved and ordered paid. Thereafter, 
the county controller refused to approve the claim and the 
instant action followed. 
The sole contention made by the controller is that the 
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county has no authority to expend money for the employ-
ment of a person to oppose the increase in rates of a public 
utility. At the argument in the District Court of Appeal it 
was suggested that specialists could not be employed except 
by ordinance. In a letter to the District Court of Appeal 
thereafter in that connection, counsel for the controller statP.d 
that he did not question the power of the board to employ 
specialists· by resolution; he contended only that the county 
funds could not be used to oppose an increase in utility rates. 
The District Court of Appeal nevertheless based its decision 
on both grounds and both will be discussed. 
San Mateo has a charter adopted in 1933 pursuant to the 
Constitution (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7%) and approved by 
the Legislature (Stats. 1933, p. 2953). It has been amended 
from time to time. Pertinent provisions relating to employ-
ment are that the board of supervisors has the power given 
to it by the Constitution, charter and ''general laws of the 
state." (Charter, art. III, § 1.) In addition to other powers 
it has the power to appoint appointive officers whose appoint-
ments are not otherwise provided for in the charter ; to con-
firm appointments of officers appointed by the county manager 
(formerly county executive, changed by Stats. 1949, p. 2938); 
to provide by ordinance for the compensation of appointive 
officers ; ''To provide, by ordinance, and therein to fix and 
regulate, the appointment and number of assistants, depu-
ties, clerks, attaches, and other persons to be employed, from 
time to time, in the several offices of the county, and therein 
to prescribe and regulate the powers, duties, qualifications 
and compensation of such persons, the times at which, and 
the terms for which, they shall be appointed, and the man-
ner of their. appointment and removal; provided, however, 
that tne ·provisions of such ordinance or ordinances, so to 
be enacted by the Board of Supervisors, shall in all respects' 
conform to and comply with all other provisions of this Char-
ter with respect to the manner and method of appointment 
and removal of sucJt assistants, deputies, clerks, ~ttaches and 
Qther employees, their powers, duties, qualifications, com-
pensation, the times of their appoiD.tment and the terins for 
which they shall be appointed." (Stats. 1943, p. 3147.) To 
provide by ordinance for other officers recommended by the 
county manager; to provide ~or the creation of offices here-
after created by the Constitution or general law. (Art. III, 
§ 2.) 
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The general law provides: ''The board of supervisors may 
contract with and employ any person for the furnishing to 
the county, or for and on behalf of any district within the 
county for furnishing to the district, of special services and 
advice in financial, economic, accounting, engineering, legal, 
or administrative matters by any persons specially trained 
and experienced and who is competent to perform the special 
services required. The board may pay from any available 
funds such compensation to any such expert as it deems proper 
for the services rendered.'' (Gov. Code, § 31000.) There 
is also a provision, particularly directed to legal matters : 
''The board of supervisors of any county not having a char-
ter which creates the office of county counsel may employ 
and contract with counsel to assist the district attorney in 
representing and advising it and all district officers in all 
matters and questions of law pertaining to their duties and 
to civil legal questions affecting the county or districts.'' 
(Gov. Code, § 31001.) 
[2] The general law, supra, which, as seen, the charter 
expressly makes applicable, clearly gives authority to the 
board to contract with or employ plaintiff and Chestnut 8B 
the furnishers of special services. Moreover, in this connec-
tion, it should be observed that the charter authorizes the 
county manager to employ, with the approv8.1. of the board, 
''experts and consultants to perform work and advise in 
connection with any of the functions of the county when 
economically advantageous." (Art. V, § 2 [f].) (See Ken-
nedy v. Ross, supra, 28 Cal.2d 569.) While it was not al-
leged that the employment and appropriation here was ap-
proved by the county manager, it is so stated in plaint:iif's 
brief and not denied by defendants. 
[3] It is equally clear that the employment of such spe-
. cialists for the performance of special services need not be 
by ordinance, as distinguished from a resolution. The char-
ter provisions heretofore discussed, which refer to action by 
ordinance, deal with officers and regular employees, depu-
ties and assistants and it is regulating their duties, com-
pensation, etc., that the board acts by ordinance. [4] Per-
sons performing specialized expert services do so on a tem-
porary basis and are neither officers nor employees, nor do 
they hold a position with the county. They are more akin 
to independent contractors. Similar services were considered 
by this court in Kennedy v. Ross, supra, 28 Cal.2d 569, where 
we were considering whether a contract to engage an archi-
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teet for a special task required an exemption from civil 
service laws by the Civil Service Commission. We said (p. 
572) : "Under the contract, the petitioner was not appointed 
to nor does he hold a position in any department or office 
of the city. The contract calls for his expert professional 
services on other than a permanent basis, but it does not fol-
low that he is thereby employed in a position in any depart-
ment of the city. The fact is otherwise. No position, tem-
porary or permanent, in any department, was thereby cre-
ated as contemplated by section 143 of the charter. The peti-
tioner was engaged to do a specific expert professional task 
for a stated consideration. 'Positions' in 'departments and 
offices' of the city connote an employment to render services 
at a salary paid periodically and are governed by the salary 
standardization and related provisions of the charter, also 
invoked by the respondent." (See Ban Francisco v. Boyd, 
17 Cal.2d 606 [110 P .2d 1036].) It is true that plaintiff 
was referred to as a special assistant to the district attor-
ney, but we do not think that took him out of the category 
considered in the Kennedy case. 
To determine the legality of the expenditure for plaintiff's 
compensation for opposing the rate increases before the com-
mission it is necessary to apply pertinent principles. · As we 
have above seen; the charter and general laws contemplate 
the employment of specialists for aiding the county in the 
performance of its functions. The charter also provides : 
"The County Manager shall have plenary power, subject 
to the provisions of general laws, with respect to advertis-
ing or exploiting the resources of the County. He shall, ex-
officio, act as secretary of any County board of trade or County 
chamber of commerce created under the provisions of the 
general laws, and in the event of the disestablishment of any 
such County board of trade or County chamber of com-
merce, he shall perform the duties and functions customarily 
performed by the secretary of such County board of trade or 
chamber of commerce. He shall consult with the Board of 
Super:v:isors with respect to any appropriations made by the 
Board of Supervisors for advertising or exploiting such re-
sources. Any appropriation made by said Board of Super-
visors shall be upon the recommendation of the CoUn.ty Man-
ager." (Art. V, § 3.) He also has power "to employ, by 
and with the approval of the Board of Supervisors, experts 
and consultants to perform work and advise, in connection 
with any of the functions of the County, when economically 
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advantageous." (Art. V, § 2 [f).) The general law pro-
vides : ''The board of supervisors may levy a . . . tax . . . 
for the purpose of inducing immigration to, and increasing 
the trade and commerce of, the county. The proceeds of the 
tax may be expended for any or all of the following uses : 
(a) Advertising, exploiting, and making known the resources 
of the county. (b) Exhibiting or advertising the agricultural, 
horticulttrral, viticultural, mineral, industrial, commercial, cli-
matic, educational, recreational, artistic, musical, cultural, 
and other resources or advantages of the county. (c) Mak-
ing plans and arrangements for a world's fair, trade fair, 
or other fair or exposition at which such resources may be 
exhibited. (d) Doing any of such work in cooperation with 
or jointly by contract with other agencies, associations, or 
corporations.'' (Gov. Code, § 26100.) Other laws have con-
templated that the counties may have an interest in the 
rates of utilities operating therein. [5] The public utility 
law provides that complaint may be made to the Public 
Utilities Commission by any "body politic" or "municipal 
corporation" as well as others concerning the rates charged 
by any public utility (Pub. Utilities Code, § 1702.) This 
provision of the public utilities law clearly authorizes the 
county to appear in rate regulation proceedings before the 
Public Utilities Commission. (See Inter-State Water Oo. v. 
City of Danville, 379 Ill. 41 [39 N.E.2d 356].) The Public 
Utilities Act does not purport "to restrict such complaints 
to patrons of the utility and the language of the above cited 
section clearly indicates that a "body politic" may act on 
behalf of its inhabitants in the prosecution of such complaints. 
Certainly, the rates charged by the only railroad traversing 
a county has a bearing upon the trade and commerce affect-
ing the county and whether people will choose to make it 
their home. Also, exploitation of the resources of the county 
can be m;1de mor.e effective depending upon the rates of the 
carriers operating therein. Apparently the board considered 
tP,at such objects would be advanced. [6] Where a substan-
tial portion of the residents or prospective residents are af-
fected, the county has a public interest in affording them 
protection. In speaking of public interest in the operation 
of a municipality in another connection it was said, quoting 
from Green v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 233 [40 S.Ct. 499, 64 L.Ed. 
878] : "What is a public purpose has given rise to no little 
judicial consideration. Courts, as a rule, have attempted 
no judicial definition of a 'public' as distinguished from a 
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'private' purpose, but have left each case to be determined 
by its own peculiar circumstances. Gray, Limitations of Tax-
ing Power, section 176, 'Necessity alone is not the test by 
which the limits of state authority in this direction are to 
be defined, but a wise statesmanship must look beyond the 
expenditures which are absolutely needful to the continued 
existence of organized government, and embrace others which 
may tend to make that government subserve the general 
well-being of society, and advance the present and prospective 
happenings and prosperity to the people': Cooley, Justice, 
in People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 [ 4 Am.Rep. 400]." (City 
of Oakland v. Williams, 206 Cal. 315, 332 [274 P. 329] .) In 
Ci_ty of Birmingham v. Wilkinson, 239 Ala. 199 [194 So. 548], 
the court held it to be a proper expenditure to employ coun-
sel to appear before the public service commission to obtain 
better telephone rates as it was for the welfare of the city . 
.(Contra, City of Purcell v. W adlim.gton, 43 Okla. 728 [144 
P. 380].) 
Taking into consideration all the foregoing provisions of 
the general law, charter and legal principles we believe it 
may be properly said that the county has the power to ex-
pend money for the purpose here present. 
There 'being adequate authority for the employment of 
petiti<?ner and · the expenditure of public money for the pur-
pose for which he was e:rp.ployed, the court should have ordered 
the issuance of the writ. 
The judg~ent is reversed. 
Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
38 C.Jd-10 
